IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

AMANDA DENISE BRIERE,

Plaintiff,

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Civil Action No. 5:15-CV-1310 (DEP)

CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Acting Commissioner of Social Security,

Defendant.

APPEARANCES: OF COUNSEL:

FOR PLAINTIFF

OLINSKY LAW GROUP 300 S. State Street 5th Floor, Suite 520 Syracuse, NY 13202 MICHELLE FECIO, ESQ.

FOR DEFENDANT

HON. RICHARD S. HARTUNIAN United States Attorney for the Northern District of New York P.O. Box 7198 100 S. Clinton Street Syracuse, NY 13261-7198

DAVID E. PEEBLES U.S. MAGISTRATE JUDGE ANDREEA LECHLEITNER, ESQ. Special Assistant U.S. Attorney

ORDER

Currently pending before the court in this action, in which plaintiff seeks judicial review of an adverse administrative determination by the Commissioner, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), are cross-motions for judgment on the pleadings. Oral argument was conducted in connection with those motions on May 12, 2016, during a telephone conference held on the record. At the close of argument I issued a bench decision in which, after applying the requisite deferential review standard, I found that the Commissioner's determination did not result from the application of proper legal principles and is not supported by substantial evidence, providing further detail regarding my reasoning and addressing the specific issues raised by the plaintiff in this appeal.

After due deliberation, and based upon the court's oral bench decision, a transcript of which is attached and incorporated herein by reference, it is hereby

ORDERED, as follows:

1) Plaintiff's motion for judgment on the pleadings is GRANTED.

This matter, which is before me on consent of the parties pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), has been treated in accordance with the procedures set forth in General Order No. 18. Under that General Order once issue has been joined, an action such as this is considered procedurally, as if cross-motions for judgment on the pleadings had been filed pursuant to Rule 12(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

2) The Commissioner's determination that plaintiff was not

disabled at the relevant times, and thus is not entitled to benefits under the

Social Security Act, is VACATED.

3) The matter is hereby REMANDED to the Commissioner, without

a directed finding of disability, for further proceedings consistent with this

determination.

4) The clerk is respectfully directed to enter judgment, based upon

this determination, remanding the matter to the Commissioner pursuant to

sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) and closing this case.

David E. Peebles

U.S. Magistrate Judge

Dated:

May 27, 2016

Syracuse, NY

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

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AMANDA DENISE BRIERE,

vs. 15-CV-1310

COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY.

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Transcript of DECISION held on May 12, 2016, at the James Hanley U.S. Courthouse, 100 South Clinton Street, Syracuse, New York, the HONORABLE DAVID E. PEEBLES, Presiding.

APPEARANCES

For Plaintiff: OLINSKY LAW GROUP (Via Telephone) 300 S. State Street

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BY: MICHELLE M. FECIO, ESQ.

For Defendant: SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION (Via Telephone) Office of Regional General Counsel

Region II

26 Federal Plaza - Room 3904 New York, New York 10278

BY: ANDREEA L. LECHLEITNER, ESQ.

1 (Via Telephone:)

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THE COURT: Well, thank you, both, for excellent written and verbal presentations. I have before me a request for judicial review of an adverse determination by the acting Commissioner.

The background of the case is as follows: The claimant -- or plaintiff -- was born in September of 1992.

She was 19 at the time she made application for SSI benefits;

21 at the time of the administrative law judge's decision;

and, by my rough calculation, is now 23.

She was in special education, some special education courses; was labeled as learning disabled as early as third grade with deficits in math, reading and writing.

She last finished eighth grade. She tried to achieve a GED but found it to be too difficult. She lives in Syracuse with her mother, her mother's husband, and a one-year-old son.

She has experienced behavioral issues and has been variously diagnosed as having bipolar disorder, post-traumatic stress disorder, panic disorder, and borderline intellectual functioning.

She has, admittedly, not taken a great deal of treatment but is on a waiting list and has planned on working with both Arise Child and Family Services and Central New York Services, Inc. where she's been evaluated.

She's not working. She only briefly worked at age

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At 2006 in seventh grade, when she was 13 and a half years old, she was tested, as we discussed. A verbal IQ of 75 was registered, as well as a full scale IQ of 79. In 2009 she was, again, tested by Dr. Seth Aldrich who determined that she had a full scale IQ of 68 and a verbal comprehension IQ of 63. That's at Page 283 of the administrative transcript.

She has had some criminal issues. She's been in juvenile detention after having run away and, at one point, was on five years probation for burglary.

She needs help and reminder that she is the primary care provider for her son. But she testified that she needs assistance, including from her stepfather who helps her and provides reminders for certain tasks that she has to perform for the child.

She also suffers from back pain and asthma and, for that, she uses an inhaler.

Procedurally, the plaintiff applied for Social Security benefits, SSI benefits, under Title 16 on March 1, 2012, alleging an onset date of March 6, 2009. A hearing was conducted by Administrative Law Judge Lisa B. Martin on November 18, 2013. A decision was rendered by ALJ Martin on March 28, 2014. The determination became a final decision of the agency on September 25, 2015, when the Social Security

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Administration Appeals Council denied plaintiff's request for review.

As we discussed, the administrative law judge's decision applies the well-known five-step protocol for determining disability, determined that plaintiff has not engaged in substantial gainful activity; found that, at Step Two, the plaintiff suffers from several severe impairments providing at least some limitation on work functions, including asthma, bipolar disorder, attention deficit hyperactivity disorder, post-traumatic stress disorder, learning disorder, and borderline intellectual functioning.

The administrative law judge then considered several of the listed presumptively disabling conditions and concluded, after considering 3.00, 12.00, 12.04, 12.05 and 12.06, that plaintiff's condition did not meet or medically equal any of the listed conditions.

The ALJ then surveyed the medical evidence and determined that the plaintiff retains the residual functional capacity to perform a full range of work at all exertional levels with various limitations, including being limited to routine, uninvolved tasks not requiring a fast assembly quota pace because of distractions preventing detailed decision-making and causing off-task behavior 5 percent of the time. Moreover, the claimant is limited to having no

more than occasional work interactions with coworkers,
supervisors and the public.

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The administrative law judge, then, after determining that plaintiff did not have any past relevant work, determined that she could not apply the Medical-Vocational Guidelines, or the grids, in light of the compromise presented by non-exertional limitations to the job base on which the grids are predicated.

Testimony of a vocational expert was elicited and it was determined that there are four positions including document preparer, callout operator, office work helper and warehouse worker that plaintiff is capable of performing, notwithstanding her limitations.

As you know, the Court's function is fairly circumscribed. It is my job to determine whether correct legal principles were applied and the determination is supported by substantial evidence.

Obviously, the focus here is on 12.05 of the listings and 12.05C, to be precise.

The first thing that, obviously, needs to be determined under that listing is whether the record supports any finding of deficits in adaptive functioning, initially manifested during the developmental period.

It may be, as defendant's counsel suggests, that, reading between the lines, you could argue that the

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administrative law judge determined that there were no such adaptive functioning limitations or deficits. But she, clearly, did not specifically address that issue in the context of listing 12.05C.

And this is a very different case than, for example, Burnette against Colvin at 564 F.App'x 605, Second Circuit's decision addressing that issue from April of 2014.

Obviously, deficits in adaptive functioning:

Direct examination of whether the person is unable to satisfactorily cope with the challenges of ordinary everyday living, including taking care of children without help sufficiently well that they have not been adjudged neglected, paying bills and avoiding eviction.

But Burnette was a very different situation. There the plaintiff had graduated from high school without special education classes; maintained a job for sometime after high school, briefly attended college and reported sometimes needing help but able to live alone, obtain a driver's license, take public transportation, shop for food and pay her bills.

The plaintiff in this case, the evidence tells a very different story and I think that the administrative law judge should have addressed adaptive functioning and the failure to do so, I think is error.

More pertinently, I think that there is a gap in

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the record. The 2006 tests, IQ tests, are clearly not
current under Section 112.00D(10) of Appendix 1. With the
rejection of Dr. Aldrich's, which I do not find is supported
by substantial evidence, nonetheless but with the
rejection of that, it leaves a void in the record and I think
that under 20 CFR 416.919A, subsection B, a consultative exam
or testing should have been required to fill that void. And,
so, I do not find that the Commissioner's determination is
supported by substantial evidence.

I think this is a very different case for rejection of IQ testing than Baszto, one of the cases that was cited, Baszto against Astrue. That was a very different situation where there was evidence of malingering. I think Dr. Aldrich's testing expresses that he is convinced of the accuracy of the testing and, so, it's a different situation.

So, for those reasons, I think that the matter needs to be remanded for further consideration by the agency.

I do not find persuasive proof of disability. I think it needs another look.

So, I will award judgment on the pleadings to the plaintiff vacating the Commissioner's determination and remand the matter without a directed finding of disability.

Again, thank you, both, for excellent presentations. I hope you have a good day.

MS. FECIO: Thank you, your Honor.

1	MS. LECHLEITNER: Thank you.
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3	CERTIFICATION
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6	I, DIANE S. MARTENS, Registered Professional
7	Reporter, DO HEREBY CERTIFY that I attended the foregoing
8	proceedings, took stenographic notes of the same, that
9	the foregoing is a true and correct copy of same and the
10	whole thereof.
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15	Dans S. Martin
16	Dena S. Macoul
17	DIANE S. MARTENS, FCRR
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